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Abstract 
Evidence for human learning without awareness of what is learned 
has been sought in serial reaction time (SRT) tasks in which, 
unknown to participants, the locations of stimuli follow a particular 
rule or sequence (Willingham, Nissen & Bullemer, 1989). A 
number of criticisms have been levelled at such tasks, including a 
lack of adequate control for sequential effects and a discrepancy in 
sensitivity between measures of implicit and explicit knowledge 
about the task (Jones & McLaren, 2009; Shanks & St. John, 1994). 
In this study we provide a novel, two-choice SRT paradigm 
whereby the locations of the response stimuli are sometimes 
predicted by a separate set of stimuli on screen. A color-filled 
square appears before each stimulus requiring a response, with 
participants informed this is simply a fixation point to prepare for 
the next trial.  Two out of eight colors are predictive on 80% of 
trials, and performance on these consistent trials was faster than on 
the other six colors that were equally likely to result in either of the 
two possible responses. All these trial types were faster and more 
accurate than the remaining inconsistent 20% of trials for the 
predictive colors, which also produce more errors than control 
colors. A prediction task and interview followed the task, on which 
participants performed at near (slightly below) chance levels. We 
suggest that this task is a useful tool for studying associative 
learning in humans, as it provides reliable effects that appear to 
demonstrate implicit learning with relatively brief training. 
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Introduction 
In 1994 Shanks and St. John published their seminal 
review of implicit learning in Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences. Their conclusion was that implicit learning in 
humans had not yet been conclusively demonstrated. One 
paradigm that seemed to hold some promise in this regard 
was the SRT task pioneered by Willingham, Nissen and 
Bullemer (1989). In this task participants had to simply 
respond to one of four possible stimulus locations by 
pressing a spatially compatible key. Unknown to them, the 
sequence in which the stimulus locations were presented 
was not random but instead repeated a particular ordering. 
Willingham et al found that participants trained on such a 
sequence learned to respond faster than controls, yet were 
unable to say much about the sequence or, importantly, to 
predict the next stimulus location given a number of 
preceding trials. Shanks and St. John analysed this result, 
and others like it, and concluded that whilst the prediction 
task was potentially a sufficiently sensitive method of 
assaying participants' knowledge of the sequence, the 
evidence suggested that the non-significant findings on the 
prediction task had more to do with a lack of power than a 
lack of knowledge. Subsequent reviews of more recent 
evidence (e.g. Lovibond and Shanks, 2002; Shanks and 
Lovibond, 2002; Mitchell, De Houwer and Lovibond, 2009) 
have seen no reason to change this conclusion.  
In this paper we attempt to provide the evidence needed to 
prove that learning can take place without awareness of 
what is being learned. We do this using a variant of the SRT 
task employed by Jones and McLaren (2009) developed by 
Aitken (1996) which, instead of using the preceding trials to 
determine the later ones, uses a separate stimulus to predict 
which of the location stimuli will be presented next. A 
colored square presented between two stimulus locations is 
the predictor stimulus, and which of the two stimulus 
locations changes from an open to a filled circle is what 
determines the response required. If the left circle fills, then 
a left key press is needed and if the right-hand circle fills 
then a right key press is appropriate. The colored square is 
presented just before a response is required (while both 
circles are unfilled) so that it can predict which response 
will shortly be needed. Rather than run a separate control 
group, we follow Cleeremans (1993) in using a within-
subject control. Thus some colors are never predictive (they 
have a random relationship with the stimulus location) 
whereas others are correlated with the response needed on 
the next trial. 
The detailed design of this paradigm was dictated by our 
assumption of a dual-process mechanism for human 
learning. Following McLaren, Green and Mackintosh 
(1994), we conceptualized learning as being driven by two 
quite different sets of processes, one Cognitive in nature, 
employing conscious, controlled, rule-based symbolic 
processes, the other Associative in nature, automatic in 
operation and based on simple algorithms that capture the 
correlations between events. The challenge, then, was to 
arrive at a paradigm that would readily allow learning on an 
associative basis but would be much less amenable to rule-
based cognition. The Aitken SRT paradigm allows for a 
parameterization that meets these requirements. We used 8 
colors in total, but made only 2 of them predictive (one left, 
one right). Thus, 6 out of the 8 bore no relationship to the 
next stimulus location to occur. Following the technique 
used by Posner and Snyder (1975), the 2 predictive colors 
were themselves only 80% reliable. Hence, if one of them 
typically predicted a left response would be the next needed, 
20% of the time it was followed by a stimulus location that 
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required a right response. Our rationale for doing this was 
that it would make conscious detection of the contingencies 
in play much harder. Due to 6 of the 8 colors being non-
predictive, the overall prediction rate possible in this 
experiment is a mere 57.5% if complete knowledge of the 
contingencies is assumed, and no stimulus is an entirely 
reliable predictor of anything. In these circumstances, we 
expected it to be very difficult to notice which colors had 
some predictive value. Any attempt to "work out" what was 
going on in this fast paced task, with many different colors 
involved, would overtax working memory and severely 
impair performance on the main, SRT task, which should 
lead to this type of strategy being quickly rejected. 
We also used the fact that there were 6 non-contingent 
colors to configure a design in which half the blocks were 
control blocks, and the other half experimental. The latter 
included the 2 contingent colors and 2 of the non-
contingent, whereas the control blocks had the other 4 non-
contingent colors in them. Control and Experimental blocks 
were alternated.  This meant that for much of the time our 
participants were not experiencing any contingency between 
the colored square and the stimulus location / response 
required. It also allowed us to define two, somewhat 
different, within subject controls for our experimental 
manipulation. The first are the control colors in the 
experimental blocks: these have the advantage of sampling 
our participants’ behavior under similar circumstances to 
those in force for the contingent, experimental colors. The 
second are the colors in the control blocks: these have the 
advantage of sampling behavior over an entire block 
without any distortions caused by the contingent colors. The 
control blocks were given exactly the same sequence of 
right and left responses as the corresponding experimental 
blocks. Thus, any sequential effects, caused by a particular 
run of right and left responses, will be controlled for by 
these blocks. As we shall see, this proved to be a useful 
aspect of our design.  
Despite our efforts to prevent conscious rule-based 
learning, the parameters chosen for this design should 
nevertheless support strong associative learning. The colors 
occur just before the stimulus location is presented and the 
response required, and feedback is available shortly 
afterward. Thus, given that there is a reliable contingency 
between a clearly perceived stimulus and stimulus location / 
response, it should be easily learned. We ensured that the 
colors were presented boldly at fixation and gave our 
participants good reason to be looking there at the start of 
each trial. If this type of learning is automatic, and stimulus 
specific, then there should be little difficulty in learning the 
association between the two predictive colors and their 
correlated stimulus locations / responses. 
 
Method 
Participants 
The study was conducted with 32 participants, randomly 
divided into two groups (n=16 in each) who performed the 
task with slightly different parameters (different distances 
between the stimuli on screen). The participants were all 
first year psychology students at the University of Exeter, 
aged from 18 to 22 years old, who were rewarded with a 
course credit in return for their participation.  
 
Materials 
An Apple iMac computer was used to run the experiment, 
with participants seated roughly 50cm from the screen. The 
display during blocks contained two white, outline circles 
and a white, outline square on a black background. The 
circles were 1.9cm in diameter, and the square was 1.9cm in 
width. The square was positioned directly in the centre of 
the screen for both groups. One group saw the circles 
positioned 2.2cm to the right and left of the centre of the 
screen, consistent with the distance separating the two-
choice SRT task stimuli in Jones & McLaren (2009). The 
other group saw the same size white circle outlines placed 
7.5cm from the right and left of the centre of the screen, 
following the stimulus locations specified in Aitken (1996).  
The predictor stimulus was a colored filled square 1.9cm 
in width that filled in the white square outline. A choice of 
eight possible colors: red, green, blue, yellow, pink, orange, 
brown and teal were used. The response signal was a white 
filled circle 1.9cm in diameter that replaced either the right 
or left outline circle during the trials. The participants were 
instructed to press the spatially compatible “x” key on a 
QWERTY keyboard if the target stimulus appeared on the 
left, and the “>” key if the stimulus appeared on the right.  
 
Design 
The experiment consisted of a two-choice SRT task 
conducted over one session that lasted approximately an 
hour. The task consisted of 20 alternating blocks, half of 
which were control blocks and half experimental, each with 
120 trials. The ordering of the blocks was counterbalanced 
across participants. On both experimental and control blocks 
participants received a random ordering of equal amounts of 
right and left response stimuli. In the experimental blocks 
participants saw four colors (red, green, blue, yellow) as the 
filled square predictor stimulus. One of these colors 
preceded a right circle fill with an 80% contingency, and 
another color appeared before the left circle filling 80% of 
the time. The other two colors in the experimental block 
occurred with equal probability before a right or left circle 
fill. The colors were randomized for each participant and the 
experimenter was blind to which colors were predictive, and 
which response they predicted.  During control blocks, all 
four colors (pink, orange, brown, teal) were equally likely to 
occur before a right or left response signal. Each color that 
could appear in a block appeared on an equal number of 
trials in that block, and all trials were constructed so that a 
color would not repeat itself on the next trial.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were instructed to fixate on the colored square 
and then to simply respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible to the white circle fills. They were told to use the 
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colored square to bring their focus back to the centre of the 
screen and therefore improve their overall performance on 
the task by avoiding bias to one side or the other. They were 
informed that the colors changed to attract their attention 
back to the centre of the screen: no mention was made of 
any contingencies or the role of the colored square as a 
predictive or instructive stimulus.  
On each trial the square would fill with the stimulus color 
and remain on screen until the computer detected a 
response. A variable interval in the range of 250-500ms 
would then occur before the white circle response signal 
appeared on screen. Reaction time was measured from this 
stimulus’ appearance on screen until a key press was 
detected. A 250ms response-stimulus interval (RSI) then 
followed before the appearance of the next colored square 
stimulus during which the screen was blank except for the 
square and circle outlines.  On each trial the stimuli 
remained on the screen until the participant had responded 
or was timed-out for not having pressed a key within 4.25s.  
If participants pressed an incorrect key or were timed-out 
then the trial terminated and the computer issued a short 
‘beep’ sound. Following each block, participants rested 
during a 30 second break in which they were shown their 
average reaction time (in milliseconds) and their accuracy 
(as a percentage) for the block of stimuli just completed. 
They were also informed whether these scores were better 
or worse than those from the previous block. At the end of 
the 20th block, participants were instructed to fetch the 
experimenter. 
A short verbal interview asking general questions about 
the task was given, and participants were then assessed to 
determine the extent of their knowledge about the 
contingencies during the experiment. They were first asked 
to describe any relationship that they had noticed between 
the colors and the circle fills. Then a prediction task was 
conducted that closely followed the procedures employed in 
the main task they had just experienced. Thus, participants 
were instructed to attend to a colored square at fixation in 
the middle of two outline circles, but now had to make a 
prediction about which circle they thought would fill by 
pressing the appropriate key. They were told that the circles 
would not fill, and that no response would be considered an 
error, apart from pressing keys other than the two response 
keys, and that there was no time limit on making their 
choice. The prediction task was presented as two short 
blocks of 16 trials per block, with each color from both 
control and experimental blocks occurring twice in each 
block in a randomized order. 
 
Results 
Results were computed for both errors and RTs, with four 
Stimulus Types compared across Blocks and at the different 
Distances between the two response signals. Those colors 
that had an 80% contingency with a right or left circle fill 
(the Experimental colors) are split into both their Consistent 
and Inconsistent presentations. For example, if a red square 
preceded a right circle fill on 80% of the trials, those 
responses would be Consistent, whilst when a red square 
was followed by a left circle fill on the other 20% of trials 
this would be Inconsistent with the trained contingency. The 
two other colors in the experimental block form one control 
set (denoted Control – Experimental Block) for within-
subject comparison, as do the four control colors from the 
control blocks (Control – Control Block). Trials following 
an error were excluded from both RT and error analyses. 
The RT and error data are shown in Figures 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Average RT in msecs for different Stimulus 
Types. 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of errors for different Stimulus Types. 
 
ANOVAs were conducted on both RT and proportion of 
errors, with Block, Distance and Stimulus Type as the 
independent variables. Blocks were collapsed into fours for 
the analyses, so each Block comprised two Experimental 
blocks and two Control blocks. The Distance of the stimulus 
did not have a main effect on the RTs, F(1,30) = .27, p = 
.61, nor on the errors, F(1,30) = .56, p = .46. Distance did 
not interact with any other variable, and therefore the 
location of the response stimuli was not a significant factor 
in determining learning of the color contingencies.  
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Figure 1 shows the average RT and proportion of errors 
for the four Stimulus Types, the main effect of Stimulus 
Type was significant for both the RTs, F(3,90) = 17.45, p < 
.001, and errors, F(3,90) = 3.72, p = .014. Both RTs and 
errors follow the same ordinal pattern, which was examined 
in more detail with a set of planned contrasts. Faster 
responses and fewer errors were made on Experimental 
Consistent trials. The difference between Experimental 
Consistent and Inconsistent trials is significant for both RTs, 
F(1,30) = 33.15, p < .001, and errors, F(1,30) = 5.463, p = 
.026, with Inconsistent stimuli responded to more slowly 
and with lower accuracy. Experimental Consistent stimuli 
are also responded to faster than both Control stimuli from 
Experimental, F(1,30) = 34.46, p < .001 and Control blocks, 
F(1,30) = 6.173, p = .019, this trend is also apparent in the 
errors, but it is significant only in the RTs. 
Experimental Inconsistent trials are slower than Control 
stimuli from Experimental blocks in RTs, F(1,30) = 4.85, p 
= .035, and show a trend toward more errors, F(1,30) = 
3.34, p = .078. Experimental Inconsistent trials are also 
slower and less accurate than Control stimuli from the 
Control blocks, significantly so in RTs, F(1,30) = 14.51, p = 
.001, and again demonstrating a trend in the errors, F(1,30) 
= 4.05, p = .053. It seems therefore that learning of the 
contingencies occurred, with performance averaged across 
the experiment showing faster and more accurate responses 
to those trials that were predicted 80% of the time by the 
preceding color. This is further highlighted by the 
decrement in performance for those trials inconsistent with 
the learnt relationship, causing participants to make more 
errors and respond slower to these stimuli than both the 
Consistent stimuli and the Control stimuli.  
The Control stimuli are interesting, in that they 
significantly differ from one another in the RTs, F(1,30) = 
9.16, p = .005, although not in the errors, F(1,30) = .62, p = 
.44. Control stimuli from the Experimental blocks are 
responded to more slowly than Control stimuli from the 
Control block. We suspect that this is due to the presence of 
the Consistent and Inconsistent stimuli in the Experimental 
Block. It is not that more errors are being made (overall) in 
the Experimental blocks, instead, it may be that the conflict 
that occurs on inconsistent trials engages mechanisms that 
produce more cautious responding, though we note that this 
cannot simply be a speed-accuracy trade-off as the error rate 
is, if anything, lower for the Control block stimuli than for 
Control stimuli from the Experimental Blocks.  
Block has a significant main effect in RTs, F(4,120) = 
9.26, p < .001, and errors, F(4,120) = 19.02, p < .001. With 
practice, participants got faster at the task but exhibited 
something of a speed-accuracy trade-off, making more 
errors progressively throughout the experiment. Block did 
not interact with Stimulus Type in the RT analysis, thus 
Experimental Consistent stimuli in Experimental Blocks 
were responded to faster than Control stimuli in Control 
Blocks, which were in turn responded to faster than Control 
stimuli in Experimental Blocks, and all are faster than 
Experimental Inconsistent stimuli. The relative positions of 
Inconsistent and Consistent stimuli are reversed in Block 1 
in the errors, however, and the interaction between Block 
and Stimulus Type for errors is significant, F(12,360) = 
2.68, p = .002. Thus, in this case, the Consistent / 
Inconsistent difference emerges over blocks.  
The structured questionnaire and prediction task were 
completed by half of the participants, eight at each Distance 
value. The other participants were simply asked to pick 
which colors were predictive: they were invited to select 
two colors from the eight possible candidates. 14 of the 16 
felt able to make the attempt, and out of the 28 responses 
that were generated 6 were correct (7 would be expected by 
chance).  
The results of the structured questionnaire for the other 16 
participants who completed the prediction task show that of 
the 32 responses, 8 were correct. If we take it that there are 
two predictive colors, and do not require the participant to 
remember which predicted left and which predicted right, 
then if we ask the participants to pick two colors out of the 
eight, the expected number of colors selected correctly is 
0.5. With 16 participants taking part the total number of 
colors correctly selected is expected to be 8 by chance, and 
it is exactly 8, approximately evenly distributed across the 
different responses (right or left) and Distances.  
Turning now to the prediction task itself, each participant 
experienced 32 trials in total. 8 of which involved the two 
predictive colors. Taking into account the requirement to 
give the appropriate response for the color, we can expect 4 
correct responses by chance to these 8 presentations. 
Inspection of Figure 3 shows that the distribution of correct 
responses across participants is approximately binomial at 
each Distance, and is centered at a mean of 4 or less.  
 
Figure 3. The number of correct responses participants gave 
for Consistent – Predictive colors. Data presented from 8 
participants who performed the task with 2.2cm Distance 
(open bars) and 8 participants who performed the task with 
7.5cm (solid bars) between response stimuli. 
 
The actual means are 3.5 and 4 for Distances of 2.2 cm 
and 7.5 cm respectively, neither of which differ significantly 
from chance, and neither of which exceed mean chance 
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expectation. Our conclusion, based on these data, is that our 
participants do not know which colors are predictive, and do 
not know what they predict. This is in accord with their self-
reports at the end of the experiment: they claimed to be 
unaware of any contingency between the color of the central 
square and the response that followed. 
 
                           General Discussion 
Our basic claim is that our participants’ behavior was 
affected by the contingencies between color and stimulus 
location / response in the absence of any conscious 
knowledge on their part about these contingencies. That 
their behavior was affected is beyond doubt; the effect is 
statistically highly significant and, by the standards of these 
things, rather easy to obtain after relatively little training. 
We believe that these characteristics make this paradigm a 
good candidate for studying associative learning in humans. 
In particular, the highly reliable difference between 
Consistent and Inconsistent responses to the contingent 
colors is noteworthy, and our results suggest that this 
difference is made up of a disadvantage for Inconsistent 
trials and an advantage for Consistent trials.  
Our use of two different types of within-subject control 
enables us to be confident that the advantage for Consistent 
trials and the disadvantage for Inconsistent trials are real. 
They also allow us to speculate about the effect of having 
these types of trial in a block. In some ways the most 
appropriate controls are those colors used as controls in the 
Experimental blocks. They are subject to the same local 
conditions, in terms of motivation, mood etc., and so 
provide an appropriate baseline for comparison with 
Consistent and Inconsistent responses to the contingent 
stimuli. We included the separate control blocks because we 
suspected that simply having some predictable trials in a 
block might alter our participants behavior, and also to 
provide a control for sequential effects. This last was 
accomplished by using exactly the same sequence of left 
and right responses in paired Control and Experimental 
blocks, the only difference between the two was in what 
colors were used in the block, and how they were paired 
with responses. Thus, in a Control block our participants 
would have exactly the same sequence of responses to 
make, but no useful information from the colored squares 
that were presented to help (or hinder) them. The fact that 
our contingent stimuli also differ from these controls on 
Consistent and Inconsistent trials gives us considerable 
confidence that there is no hidden artifact responsible for 
our results.  
The difference between the Experimental control stimuli 
and the Control block control stimuli is also revealing. We 
hypothesize that this difference, with Experimental block 
controls performing worse than Control block controls, is 
due to the conflict experienced on Inconsistent trials leading 
to a greater cautiousness on some trials (perhaps best 
described as some kind of post-stimulus presentation 
checking process) that does not shift performance in terms 
of any speed – accuracy trade-off. By this we mean that the 
slower RTs do not lead to higher accuracy, but instead 
reflect an additional “cost” that is incurred in task 
performance. It is difficult to speculate any further on what 
the exact nature of this cost might be, but one possibility is 
that perceptual information specifying which stimulus 
location had occurred might continue to be gathered post-
decision on some proportion of trials as part of the checking 
process. If this mostly occurred on trials where the decision 
was the correct one (which given the low absolute error 
rates of our participants is quite likely), then it would have 
relatively little impact on the error rate but a significant 
impact on RTs. This analysis can only apply if the chance of 
engaging the checking process is unrelated to the probability 
of making an error, and low enough to result in a low 
frequency of occurrence on trials that result in an error. In 
these circumstances our RT measure would be much more 
sensitive to such a process than the error estimate (because 
the latter would be based on so few data points), so a result 
in the RTs alone would be quite possible. All speculation 
aside, this result is, as far as we are aware, a novel one, and 
opens up a new line of enquiry that may well be related to 
recent work by Verbruggen et al (in press). 
Now we turn to some consideration of the arguments that 
may be raised to suggest that our prediction test results do 
not prove that our participants had no conscious knowledge 
of the contingencies. The most obvious is that the prediction 
test results apply to only half the participants. This objection 
is of no concern, as the effects we report, i.e. the advantage 
for Consistent vs. Inconsistent, the advantage for Consistent 
trials relative to both types of Control trial and the 
disadvantage for Inconsistent trials are all significant if only 
the 16 participants who were given the prediction test are 
included. We’ve included all our data because this gives the 
best estimate of the pattern of performance on the main task, 
and because it gives the best estimate of the ability of 
participants to pick the contingent colors during the 
structured interview. Another objection that might be raised 
is that the prediction task itself is flawed, in that it a) takes 
place after the main task by which time participants have 
forgotten which are the contingent colors and b) is not 
sufficiently like the main task to help them recall this 
information. Our response is that our participants appear to 
have learned to respond faster to Consistent trials relatively 
early in the experiment, certainly by the time they reached 
the 6th block, and appear to have had no trouble 
remembering this information (if that was how they were 
doing it) from block to block from then on. And our 
prediction task used the same room, same computer, same 
display, same stimuli presented in a very similar fashion, it 
was simply the response requirements and consequent 
presentation rate (and feedback) that were different to the 
main task. If our participants consciously knew which were 
the contingent stimuli, this should have acted as a salient 
reminder of that information. 
Perhaps more troublesome for our analysis is the 
objection that, whilst our prediction test does attempt to 
assess the correct information (Shanks & St. John, 1994), it 
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does not do so sensitively enough. We only gave two blocks 
of 16 trials each, compared to the 20 blocks of 120 trials 
each for the main task. Is this really a fair test of our 
participants’ knowledge about the color-response 
contingencies? To which question our answer has to be 
“yes”. The point here is that, in order to be effective in 
determining RT to respond to the stimulus location, 
participants’ knowledge must be of the categorical variety if 
the idea of “conscious knowledge” is to mean anything 
different to “there’s been some change in behavior”. They 
must know that this color predicts this location / response, 
even allowing for a caveat to the effect that this prediction 
will not always be valid. In other words, they must know, 
when faced with the appropriate stimulus input, that some 
colors are predictive and that others do not seem to be. Only 
then can conscious knowledge produce the desired pattern 
of results. If this were the case, then our 8 trials for the 
contingent colors should be more than adequate to detect 
this type of categorical knowledge. If they get all 8 correct, 
then this is significantly better than chance on an individual 
basis. Even allowing for only some of the participants being 
aware of the contingencies, the means over all 16 
participants who took the test should produce overwhelming 
evidence of such knowledge if only as many as 4 were 
aware of the contingencies. But we do not even have means 
that are greater than chance to report for our prediction test, 
let alone means approaching significance.  
Another possibility is that the effect observed in the RTs 
might be due to our participants being aware of the 
contingencies on very few trials during the experiment (and 
then they forget), and that we have simply not given enough 
trials in the prediction task to capture any of these trials. 
This is implausible. Firstly, once the contingencies are 
explicitly coded – then this should in itself increase the 
probability of noticing them again until it becomes a 
frequent occurrence. Secondly, even a rate as low as say 1 
trial in every 8 of the predictive colors (i.e. 2.5 on average a 
block in training) would produce a mean on our prediction 
test of 4.5 that is significantly different to that observed 
(Z=2.27, p<.05). And the effect on these individual trial RTs 
would have to be large (approx 40msec). There is no 
evidence for such a bimodal distribution in our data. 
It would seem, then, that we have good evidence for 
implicit performance on our task. It is still possible that we 
may have not demonstrated implicit learning, if we adopt a 
position that results from a stringent application of the 
Shanks and St. John criteria (our thanks to Tony Dickinson 
for pointing this out). Imagine that during training on some 
trials our participants became aware of the contingencies, 
but then forgot this prior to being asked. They would have 
learned the contingencies, but not implicitly. This learning 
might then give rise to performance that reflected the 
learning, but still without conscious knowledge of the 
contingencies so that they passed our prediction test. This 
type of implicit performance, based on a form of implicit 
memory, would explain our results. In the limit, it is almost 
impossible to discount this type of critique, but we think 
that it lacks plausibility when applied to our paradigm. 
There is not much to learn, just that two colors predict 
responses, and if participants were to become repeatedly 
aware of this (so that learning could occur), it’s hard to see 
why they would forget this so easily. 
Our conclusion, then, is that we have demonstrated 
learning in human participants without conscious awareness 
of what has been learned. This robust effect has been 
accomplished in a single, one-hour session with relatively 
few participants. These considerations suggest that this 
paradigm is ideally suited to the study of implicit processes, 
and we hope to report the results of further investigations 
with this paradigm in the near future.  
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